Touro Law Review
Volume 11

Number 1

Article 9

1994

Expert Testimony
Barry C. Scheck

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview
Part of the Courts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Evidence Commons

Recommended Citation
Scheck, Barry C. (1994) "Expert Testimony," Touro Law Review: Vol. 11: No. 1, Article 9.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss1/9

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For
more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

Scheck: Expert Testimony

EXPERT TESTIMONY
Hon. George C. Pratt:
With that thought out, we will pass on to our next speaker,
Professor Barry Scheck from Cardozo Law School. He is going
to take up the subject of expert testimony. Barry.
ProfessorBarry C. Scheck*:

I. RAPE SHIELD LAWS: NOTICE PROVISIONS
Before I take up the law of experts in twenty-plus minutes, I
would note that one of the things that has always bothered me
about the Rape Shield Laws1 is not the substance, but the notice
* Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Legal Education, Benjamin
N. Cardozo School of Law. B.S., 1971, Yale University; J.D., 1974,
University of California at Berkeley. The Author, along with co-counsel Peter
Neufeld, is co-chair of the DNA Task Force of the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers and worked as counsel of record or advisor on a
number of DNA cases, including People v. Castro, People v. Keene, and

United States v. Bonds. His most recent article was published in the Cardozo
Law Review and is entitled DNA and Daubert. Most recently, this Author has

joined the defense team for the O.J. Simpson murder trial.
1. The Rape Shield Laws are encompassed within the Federal Rules of

Evidence and the New York Criminal Procedure Law. See FED. R. EVID. 412.
Rule 412 provides in relevant part:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in
which a person is accused of [rape or of assault with the intent to
commit rape], reputation or opinion evidence of the past sexual behavior
of an alleged victim of such [rape or assault] is not admissible.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in
which a person is accused of [rape or of assault with the intent to
commit rape], evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior other than
reputation or opinion evidence is also not admissible, unless such
evidence other than reputation or opinion evidence is(1) admitted in accordance with subdivisions (c)(1) and (c)(2) and is
constitutionally required to be admitted; or
(2) admitted in accordance with subdivision (c) and is evidence of(A) past sexual behavior with persons other than the accused,
offered by the accused upon the issue of whether the accused
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provisions. 2 I think one of the most distressing cases out of the
United States Supreme Court was Taylor v. Illinois,3 which had
was or was not, with respect to the alleged victim, the source
of semen or injury; or
(B) past sexual behavior with the accused and is offered by the
accused upon the issue of whether the alleged victim
consented to the sexual behavior with respect to which [rape
or assault] is alleged.
Id. Subsequent to this Symposium, Rule 412 was amended on September 7,
1994; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney 1992). Section
60.42 states:
Evidence of a victim's sexual conduct shall not be admissible in a
prosecution for an offense or an attempt to commit an offense defined in
article one hundred thirty of the penal law unless such evidence:
1. proves or tends to prove specific instances of the victim's prior
sexual conduct with the accused; or
2. proves or tends to prove that the victim has been convicted of an
offense under section 230.00 of the penal law within three years
prior to the sex offense which is the subject of the prosecution; or
3. rebuts evidence introduced by the people of the victim's failure to
engage in sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse or sexual
contact during a given period of time; or
4. rebuts evidence introduced by the people which proves or tends to
prove that the accused is the cause of pregnancy or disease of the
victim, or the source of semen found in the victim; or
5. is determined by the court after an offer of proof by the accused
outside the hearing of the jury, or such hearing as the court may
require, and a statement by the court of its findings of fact
essential to its determination, to be relevant and admissible in the
interests of justice.
Id.
2. See FED. R. EvID. 412(c). Section (c)(1) provides in part:
If the person accused of committing [rape or assault with intent to
commit rape] intends to offer ... evidence of specific instances of the
alleged victim's past sexual behavior, the accused shall make a written
motion to offer such evidence not later than fifteen days before the date
on which the trial in which such evidence is to be offered is scheduled to
begin ....
Id.; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42. New York does not contain a notice
provision in its rape shield law; see also Deborah Stavile Bartel, A Comparison
of the Federaland New York State Rape Shield Statutes, 11 TOURo L. REV. 73
(1994). Professor Bartel explains that the New York Rape Shield Law has no
notice provision, which is unlike the Federal Rape Shield Law.
3. 484 U.S. 400 (1987).
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to do with notice provisions and alibi statutes. 4 That was what
Deborah was talking about 5 with respect to Michigan v. Lucas. 6

The issue in Lucas was remanded with respect to whether or not
the attorney purposefully waited until the last minute to give
notice about an exception to the Rape Shield Law. 7
Now, this issue also arose in the Mike Tyson case. 8 In this
case, Tyson was trying to introduce evidence that there had been

prior sexual contact with Desiree Washington on the day of the
Miss Black America beauty pageant in Indianapolis where they
were seen necking with each other. 9 Dershowitz,

10

Tyson's

attorney, raised a federal constitutional claim based on the
exclusion of defense witnesses' testimony when he failed to

4. Id. at 413-16 n.21. The Supreme Court explained in Taylor that the
Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment was not violated where
the trial court refused to allow a defense witness to testify before the jury as a
sanction for failure to identify the witness in response to a pretrial discovery
request. Id.
5. Bartel, supra note 2, at 80-82.
6. 500 U.S. 145, 152 (1991) (holding that the Sixth Amendment was not
necessarily violated by precluding evidence of defendant's own past sexual
conduct with the victim on the grounds that the defendant failed to comply with
the notice requirements of Michigan's Rape Shield Law).
7.

People v. Lucas, _

N.W.2d _

(Mich. July 6, 1994) (text not

available).
8. Tyson v. State, 619 N.E.2d 276 (Ind. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1216 (1994). The court held that although the defense team did not engage in
"blatant and deliberate misconduct or bad faith" by delaying its notification to
the state of its potential witnesses, the trial court properly barred these
witnesses from testifying because the delay was excessive and the defense had
knowledge of the witnesses two days prior to notifying the state. Id. at 282.
9. Id. at 286 (asserting that three witnesses had seen a female with
"prominent hair" and Tyson exit the limousine and enter the hotel together).
See Ira Berkow, Tyson Defense Goes to Court for Reversal of Conviction.
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 16, 1993, at B9, BI 1. Alan Dershowitz, Tyson's attorney.
argued that the trial judge "unfairly excluded three witnesses ...

who had

seen Tyson and Washington 'necking' in Tyson's limousine on the morning of
July 19, 1992." Id.
10. Alan Morton Dershowitz received his law degree at Yale University in
1962. Alan Dershowitz is currently a criminal law Professor at Harvard Law
School.
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comply with the notice provision. 11 However, the Indiana
12
Supreme Court split two - two and never reached the issue,

because Dershowitz wound up talking with the wife of an Indiana
Supreme Court judge at a Yale Law School reunion. 13 The
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 14 So, we will
never know the answer to that question.
With respect to Taylor, 15 the Supreme Court held that evidence

of an alibi can be precluded if, for purposes of strategic
advantage, the lawyer, without knowledge to the defendant,
failed to comply with the notice provisions. 16 The same theory
11. Tyson, 619 N.E.2d at 288-89. Dershowitz argued that the trial court
violated the Confrontation Clause by excluding evidence "regarding incidents
between [Desiree Washington] ...and her parents which allegedly would
have shown that [Desiree Washington] ...had 'a powerful and secret motive'

to fabricate the rape charge and would have exposed an alternative explanation
for
the
psychological
problems
experienced
by
IDesiree
Washington] ... following the ... incident." Id.
12. See Tyson v. Indiana, 622 N.E.2d 457 (Ind. 1992). The Chief Justice
of the Indiana Supreme Court decided to recuse himself from hearing Tyson's
appeal after he learned that his wife had given innocuous advice to Alan
Dershowitz. Id. at 458-59.
13. Id. See Judge Disqualified, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1993, at 8 (stating
that Chief Justice Randall Shepard of the Indiana Supreme Court denied
Tyson's request to reverse his recusal).
14. Tyson, 619 N.E.2d 276 (Ind. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1216
(1994).
15. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988). Taylor involved a discovery
violation whereby petitioner's answer to a discovery motion requesting a list of
defense witnesses failed to list a witness who later testified at trial. Id. at 40405. The Supreme Court held that where the discovery violation occurred,
preclusion of the witness' testimony was an acceptable sanction. Id. at 414.
16. Id. The Supreme-Court held that since the "violations were designed to
conceal a plan to present fabricated testimony," it was acceptable to preclude
evidence where there was a discovery violation. Id. Furthermore, the Court
held that "it would be entirely appropriate to exclude the tainted evidence
regardless of whether other sanctions would also be merited." Id. The Court
explained that:
It may well be true that alternative sanctions are adequate and
appropriate in most cases, but it is equally clear that they would be less
effective than the preclusion sanction and that there are instances in
which they would perpetuate rather than limit the prejudice to the State
and the harm to the adversary process.
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would apply theoretically in a Rape Shield case, if, for purposes
of strategic advantage, defendant's lawyer withheld notice
without his or her client's knowledge. It will be the client who is
punished and who will be unable to introduce evidence of
17
innocence.
Justice Brennan's dissent in Taylor stated that in those instances
where the lawyer has failed to follow the notice provision, it is
the lawyer who should be sanctioned while the client should
receive a new trial to determine his or her innocence. 18 After all,
if you have evidence of an alibi which is evidence of innocence,
it seems to me that because your lawyer engaged in sharp
practice, the client should not be punished. 19 I have always been
distressed about that decision.
H. EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. Ultimate Issue: Rule 704
If you look at the differences between federal and state law
with respect to expert testimony, there are a few important
distinctions. One of the more interesting rules is Federal Rule of
Evidence 704,20 which pertains to the ultimate issue. In the
1d. at 413-14.
17. See United States v. Eagle Thunder, 893 F.2d 950, 954 (8th Cir.

1990) (ruling that the attorney's failure to file a written notice of intent under
Rule 412(c)(1) was alone sufficient to deny order of proof in prosecution for
forcible rape); United States v. Provost, 875 F.2d 172, 177 (8th Cir.) (barring
the defendant from offering a statement made by the victim because the
attorney failed to give fifteen days notice), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 859 (1989).
18. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 436 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
asserted that "absent evidence that the defendant was responsible for the
discovery violation, the exclusion of criminal defense evidence is arbitrary and
disproportionate to the purposes of discovery
dissenting).

.

/d. (Brennan, J.,
I."

19. Id. at 431 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan explained that
"the arbitrary and disproportionate nature of the preclusion sanction is
highlighted where the penalty falls on the defendant even though he bore no
responsibility for the discovery violation." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
20. FED. R. EvID. 704. Rule 704 states that:
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federal courts, an expert can testify to the ultimate issue if the
expert testimony is otherwise admissible, 2 1 except in cases of
insanity or in cases where the mental condition of the defendant
is an element of the defense. 22 This is the so-called John
Hinckley Jr. exception. 23 After Hinckley was acquitted by reason
of insanity, 24 Congress passed a statute and Rule 704 was
amended so that psychiatrists could only testify about the nature
of the psychiatric disorder and not about an opinion with respect
to the mental state of the defendant since this would be the

(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), testimony in the form of an
opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or
condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or
inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental
state or condition constituting an element or the crime charged or of a
defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact
alone.
Id.
21. Id. See, e.g., Hanson v. Waller, LVL, Inc., 888 F.2d 806, 811 (11th
Cir. 1989) (upholding testimony of a police officer who testified as a
reconstruction expert with regard to an accident because his testimony was a
proper opinion going to the ultimate issue); United States v. Theordoropaulos,
866 F.2d 587, 591 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating that it is not a valid objection that
the expert's "conclusions pertain to an ultimate issue in the case"); United
States v. Sessa, 806 F. Supp. 1063, 1066 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that it was
not sensible to preclude expert testimony on a question of fact, on the grounds
that the testimony went to the very issue before the jury).
22. FED. R. EvID. 704(b), supra note 20. See, e.g., United States v.
Manley, 893 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1990) ("Rule 704 was not amended,
however, to eclipse the experts' role in enabling defendants to raise the
insanity defense.").
23. See Henry T. Miller, Recent Changes in Criminal Law: The Federal
Insanity Defense, 46 LA. L. REV. 337, 349 (1985-86) (adducing legislative
history to suggest the new standard defining criminal insanity, otherwise
known as the John Hinckley exception, should reduce the scope of expert
testimony as well as the scope of what constitutes legal insanity).
24. See United States v. Cameron, 907 F.2d 1051, 1061 (11th Cir. 1990)
("The Insanity Defense Reform Act was passed in the wake of John Hinckley's
acquittal of charges arising from his actions in shooting President Ronald
Reagan and Press Secretary James Brady.").
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"ultimate issue" which are matters for the trier of fact. 25 In New
York State, everything is the opposite. 26 That is to say, an expert

cannot testify to the ultimate issue except in insanity cases. 27
B. Rule 703
With respect to the other rules of evidence, the rule of thumb

for those us who practice in both federal and state courts is this:
If you are in the federal court everything is coming in, but if you

are in the state court not so much of it is coming in. With respect
to expert testimony, even though for some of these rules you will
see that the linguistics sound the same, when you actually

examine the decisions and the behavior of courts, on the state and
the federal level, things are sort of different.
25. Congress had amended the Federal Rules of Evidence to reduce the
use of expert testimony with regard to the insanity defense. FED. R. EVID.
704(b), supra note 20. See Cameron, 907 F.2d at 1062 ("Congress was
concerned about the danger that expert psychiatric testimony regarding
inherently malleable psychological concepts can be misused at trial to mislead
or confuse the jury.").
26. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §60.55(1) (McKinney 1992). Section

60.55(1) provides:
When, in connection with the affirmative defense of lack of criminal
responsibility by reason of mental disease or defect, a psychiatrist or
licensed psychologist testifies at a trial concerning the defendant's
mental condition at the time of the conduct charged to constitute a
crime, he must be permitted to make a statement as to the nature of any
examination of the defendant, the diagnosis of the mental condition of
the defendant and his opinion as to the extent, if aty, to which the
capaci y of the defendant to know or appreciate the nature and
consequence of such conduct, or its wrongfulness, was impaired as a
result of mental disease or defect at that time.
Id. (emphasis added); see also People v. Stone, 35 N.Y.2d 69. 75-76, 315
N.E.2d 787, 791, 358 N.Y.S.2d 737, 742. The New York Court of Appeals
had observed that Criminal Procedure Law section 60.55 -represents a
legislative recognition of the importance of adequate psychiatric opinion," and
permits a psychiatrist's expert opinion to be admitted "where the opinion is
substantially, though not exclusively, based upon observation and examination
of the defendant and the facts in evidence." Id.
27. See, e.g., People v. Weinstein, 156 Misc. 2d 34, 39. 591 N.Y.S.2d
715, 720 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1992) (recognizing that insanity cases are
cases where experts may testify to the ultimate issue).
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First, on the subject of expert testimony, in federal court the
expert opinion testimony will be relevant and admissible if it is
helpful. 28 In the state court, however, the phrase will sometimes
be used, "if it is otherwise beyond the ken of the jury." 2 9 Now,
what is the difference between "helpful" and "beyond the ken of
the jury"? I do not know linguistically whether it is that much,
but you will see that the state courts will sometimes explain that
it is not beyond the ken of the jury and thus keep the expert out.
One would not find that result in the federal courts. 30
Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 31 is particularly
important in this regard. Rule 703 states that otherwise
inadmissible evidence, such as hearsay or other kinds of
inadmissible evidence, can be admitted when an expert is
testifying as to the basis of his or her opinion if, under Rule 703,
it is reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. 32
28. See FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's notes. "Whether the
situation is a proper one for the use of expert topinioni testimony is to be
determined on the basis of assisting the trier [of fact]." Id.; The Keds Corp. v.
Goldstreet Holdings, Inc., No. 92-56221, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 3188 (9th
Cir. Feb. 18, 1994) ("Generally, expert opinion testimony is admissible if it is
'helpful to the trier of facts.'").
29. See, e.g., People v. Cronin, 60 N.Y.2d 430, 433, 458 N.E.2d 351,
353, 470 N.Y.S.2d 110, 112 (1983) (stating that the combined impact on a
person's mental state or ability to act purposefully from a case of beer,
marihuana and valium "cannot be said as a matter of law to be within the ken
of the typical juror"); see WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
658 (1991) (defining 'ken' as the range of perception, understanding or
knowledge).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Tapia-Ortiz, 23 F.3d 738 (2d Cir. 1994). In
Tapia-Ortiz, the Second Circuit held that testimony concerning "the weight,
purity, dosages, and prices of cocaine clearly relates to knowledge beyond the
ken of the average juror" and thus within the bounds of acceptable use of
expert testimony. Id. at 741.
31. FED. R. EVID. 703. This rule states that:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the
expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
Id.
32. Id.
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For a long time in New York there was a rule that experts
could not testify about hearsay. 33 This rule was modified to allow
an expert witness to testify as to what material he or she used as

a basis of his or her expert opinion. 34 This was further modified
in People v. Sugden.35 Linguistically, the rule was that an expert
could testify to the basis of his or her opinion if it was the kind
36
of information that experts in that field regarded as reliable. It
should be noted that the word "reliable" was used.

Now, is there a difference linguistically between an expert
reasonably relying upon something if it is the kind of data that is
reasonably relied upon in an expert's field, and something that is
considered reliable for experts in this field to rely upon? I do not
know. When one begins to look at the cases, one will find that in
33. See People v. Strait, 148 N.Y. 566, 42 N.E. 1045 (1896). In Strait,
the New York Court of Appeals held that the doctor should not have been
sworn in as an expert witness. Id. at 569, 42 N.E. at 1045. "The witness was
an expert on the diseases of the mind, but he was not an expert on determining
the facts, where such facts had to be obtained from the statements of others."
Id. at 570, 42 N.E. at 1046. The court relied on the fact that "'a medical
witness must give the facts on which his opinion is founded in connection with
his opinion. If those facts necessarily include information given him by the
attendants of the patient, his opinion is not competent, for those
communications are hearsay.'" Id. (citation omitted).
34. People v. DiPiazza, 24 N.Y.2d 342, 248 N.E.2d 412, 300 N.Y.S.2d
545 (1969). The New York Court of Appeals determined that section 4515 of
the Civil Practice Law and Rules then allowed an expert witness to testify
without specifying the data upon which his or her opinion is based, with the
requirement that such data may be required to be revealed upon crossexamination of the expert. Id. at 351, 248 N.E.2d at 417, 300 N.Y.S.2d at
552.
35. 35 N.Y.2d 453, 323 N.E.2d 169, 363 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1974). An
expert "may rely on material, albeit of out-of-court origin, if it is of a kind
accepted in the profession as reliable in forming a professional opinion." Id. at
460, 323 N.E.2d at 173, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 929. The expert "may also rely on
material, which if it does not qualify under the professional test, comes from a
witness subject to full cross-examination on the trial." Id. at 461, 323 N.E.2d
at 173, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
36. Id. at 461, 323 N.E.2d at 172, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 929. It is additionally
important that the expert witness distinguish between what part of his outside
investigation he relied on in forming his opinion and upon what part he did not
rely. Id.
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New York things will be kept out that would otherwise come
right in in federal courts.
There is one New York Court of Appeals case, Hambsch v.
New York City Transit Authority, 37 where a doctor testified as to
the basis of his opinion based solely on statements made by the

plaintiff's radiologist. 38 However, the radiologist's conclusions
were based on a study whereby the underlying facts of the study
were not known by the radiologist. 39 The New York Court of
Appeals excluded this testimony stating that this was not
40
something it would call a reliable basis for the expert opinion.
There is some sign in theory that the decision in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 4 1 affects Rule 703 of the
37. 63 N.Y.2d 723, 469 N.E.2d 516, 480 N.Y.S.2d 195 (1984).
38. Id. at 725, 469 N.E.2d at 517, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 196. Plaintiff's
physician, in order to establish that the plaintiff had suffered a serious injury
based on a fracture, testified that she was "suffering from spondylolisthesis, a
misalignment of the vertebra." Id. The physician made this diagnosis after
speaking with a radiologist two days before trial. Id.
39. Id. The radiologist believed that the plaintiff was suffering from
spondylolisthesis because of a study which was unknown, and in which he did
not participate. Id.
40. Id. The court determined that the physician's testimony was
inadmissible because it was based on out-of-court material which did not meet
the "professional reliability" standard, as it was not "of a kind accepted in the
profession as reliable in forming a professional opinion." Id. at 726, 469
N.E.2d at 518, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 197. The New York Court of Appeals
affirmed the Appellate Division, Second Department, holding that because the
plaintiff failed to present evidence "establishing the reliability of the out-ofcourt material," the opinion of the physician was inadmissible. Id.
41. 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993). In Daubert, the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of the proper standard for admitting expert testimony. Id. at 2792. The
Court held that "the Frye test was superseded by the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence." Id. at 2793. The Court noted that Frye's requirement that
there be a general acceptance requirement "would be at odds with the 'liberal
thrust' of the Federal Rules and their 'general approach of relaxing the
traditional barriers to 'opinion' testimony.'" Id. at 2794 (citation omitted).
Where the expert testimony relates to scientific evidence, the Supreme Court
held that a trial judge must look to whether "the reasoning or methodology
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue." Id. at 2796. The
Court concluded that:
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Federal Rules of Evidence, although the only place that I can find
it is yet another troubling case, United States v. Locascio,42 or
what one would otherwise know as the John Gotti case. 4 3
In the Gotti case, an FBI agent got on the witness stand and
testified. In order to get the full effect, you had to walk into the
courtroom to see it. That was what really made it special. If you
walked into Judge Glasser's courtroom in the Eastern District,
you would see a series of photographs; each picture of an
individual being about four feet high. There was also a poster
that went to just about the ceiling of the courtroom that
44
represented the structure of the crime family.
"'IGleneral acceptance' is not a necessary precondition to the
admissibility of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence
- - especially Rule 702 - - land] do assign to the trial judge the task of

ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation
and is relevant to the task at hand."
Id. at 2799.
42. 6 F.3d 924, 938 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Although Daubert involved Rule 702
and scientific evidence, the flexibility of the federal rules also applies to Rule
703 and the determination of the trustworthiness of the sources of expert
testimony. The district court has broad discretion to decide the admissibility of
expert testimony based on inadmissible evidence."), cert. denied, Gotti v.
United States, 114 S. Ct. 1645 (1994).
The Second Circuit in Locascio addressed the issue as to whether an expert
can testify to the nature and "function of organized crime families." Id. at 936.
The court noted that there have been previous cases which have upheld the use
of expert testimony with regard to organized crime families. Id. The court
explained that "it is still a reasonable assumption that jurors are not well
versed in the structure and methods of organized crime families." Id. at 937.
The court also held that the expert was qualified to testify based on his
extensive background with the FBI. Id. The court finally held that a trial judge
need not specifically make a trustworthiness finding as to "the admissibility of
expert testimony based on inadmissible evidence." Id. at 938.
43. Id. at 929. John Gotti and Frank Locascio were both tried and
convicted as co-defendants for violating the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt
Organizations Act, which "stemmed from their involvement with the Gambino
Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra. . . ." Id.
44. See generally Robert J. Annello, It With the Old. In with the New.
Charts and DiagransStill Do the Job in Court, 209 N.Y. L.J. S-I (Feb. 16,
1993). In general, the trial judge has the discretion to determine if
demonstrative evidence will be admissible at trial. Id. "Courts have become
increasingly liberal in permitting use of visual aids." Id.
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The expert in this case testified that Gotti was the head of the
crime family and Sammy the Bull was second in charge. 4 5 An
expert also testified that people at the upper echelons of the crime
family are the only people that can authorize a murder 46 and
thus, if these people were murdered, that meant that Gotti
authorized it. 47 Now, it is not particularly surprising to see an
expert in an organized crime case or in a narcotics distribution

case take the stand and explain street jargon 4 8 or explain in
theory this is how a narcotics operation ordinarily runs; or even
in an ordinary small street sale that this is a runner, that this is
the person who stands by and is the source, and would testify,
generally speaking, to the structure. Then, from this testimony,
the jury could apply it to the facts of the case.
49
However, the Second Circuit, in United States v. Brown,
placed certain limitations where an expert could not go too far
and literally usurp the function of the jury. 50 Therefore, what
45. United States v. Gambino, 835 F. Supp. 74 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). In
Gambino, Special FBI Agent Gabriel "identified John Gotti as the Boss of the
Gambino Organized Crime Family, George Remini as a made member in that
family, Tommy Debrizzi as an acting captain in the Gambino Family and
Tommy Bilotti as the underboss of the Gambino Family." Id. at 77.
46. Locascio, 6 F.3d at 936. Special Agent Schiliro "testified that a 'boss'
must approve all illegal activity and especially all murders, and that the
functions of the 'consigliere' and 'underboss' are only 'advisory' to the
'boss.'" Id.
47. Id.During Agent Schiliro's testimony, "Schiliro specifically named
John Gotti as the boss of the alleged Gambino Family . . . ."Id.
48. See United States v. Skowronski, 968 F.2d 242, 246 (2d Cir. 1992)
(upholding expert testimony of government agents for the purpose of
explaining organized crime jargon); see also United States v. Angiulo, 847
F.2d 956, 973-75 (1st Cir.) (upholding testimony of an agent who testified
about the structure of organized crime families), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 928
(1988); United States v. Daly, 842 F.2d 1380, 1387-88 (2d Cir.) (explaining
that the expert testimony was relevant for the jury to understand the nature and
structure of organized crime families), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988).
49. 776 F.2d 397, 401 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1141
(1986).
50. Id. at 400-01. In Brown, the Second Circuit recognized that Federal
Rule of Evidence 704(a) abolished the "ultimate issue" rule which excluded
expert testimony "because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the
trier of fact." Id. at 400 n.3. On this point, however, the court further stated

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss1/9

12

Scheck: Expert Testimony

1994]

EXPERT TESTIMONY

was going on arguably in the Locascio case was disturbing
because the expert was able to testify as to the structure of the
organized crime family and some of the other details in terms of
interpreting tapes admittedly based on information that came
from unknown informants that were not going to ever be revealed
before the court. 5 1 The expert testimony was then challenged in a
number of ways. The defense explained that he was not really an
expert in linguistics, nor in sound since he could not interpret
tapes. 52 It seems to me that the more important question the
Second Circuit examined was whether Daubert stated that
"reasonably relied" upon by experts in the field, under Federal
Rules of Evidence 703, means "reliable" too. 53
that district judges should follow the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 704
in determining whether to limit expert testimony:
The abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower the bars so as to
admit all opinions. Under Rules 701 and 702, opinions must be helpful
to the trier of fact, and Rule 403 provides for exclusion of evidence
which wastes time. These provisions afford ample assurances against the
admission of opinions which would merely tell the jury what result to
reach, somewhat in the manner of the oath-helpers of an earlier day.
Id. at 401.
51. Locascio, 6 F.3d at 936-37. An issue that arose in Locascio was
whether prosecutor's witness could qualify as an expert "to interpret tapes or
give his opinion on the Gambino Family structure." Id.
52. Id. Gotti and Locascio argued that since the expert was not properly
qualified as an expert in the areas of linguistics, sociology of crime, voice
analysis or tape recording technology, "he was not qualified to interpret tapes
or give his opinion on the Gambino Family structure." Id.
53. Id. at 938. The Second Circuit in Locascio admitted expert testimony
under Rule 703 on matters concerning the structure and function of organized
crime families "since there is little question that law enforcement agents
routinely and reasonably relied upon such hearsay in the course of their
duties." The Second Circuit was in essence combining the meaning of
"reasonably relied upon" and "reliable" with respect to the expert testimony of
Agent Schiliro since he is "assumed 'to have the skill to properly evaluate the
hearsay ....

.'"

Id. (citation omitted).

The connection between reliability and reasonably relied upon in Daubert 1.
MerrellDow Pharmaceuticals,Inc. is derived from the following language:

Unlike an ordinary witness, see Rule 701, an expert is permitted wide
lattitude to offer opinions, including those that are not based on firsthand knowledge or observation.... Presumably, this relaxation of the
usual requirement of first-hand knowledge--a rule which represents "'a
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The question then becomes, whether this expert can testify in
the Locascio case and will his testimony be reliable, even though

it is presumed that he is testifying on the basis of unknown
individuals who are afraid to come forward to speak. 54 In
addition, the expert may not be subjected to cross-examination or
investigation. 55 That, to me, is really pushing it. It is the kind of
thing that sometimes happens when you have defendants of this
kind of notoriety.
Theoretically, the Locascio court interpreted Daubert to mean
that when examining evidence, it is inconsequential whether
experts in that field always use similar evidence as a basis for
expert opinions. 56 If that is not reliable then it is not proper
scientific knowledge and it still might be kept out. Which leads
me, of course, to Federal Rule of Evidence 70257 and the
Daubert case itself.

most pervasive manifestation' of the common law insistence upon 'the
most reliable sources of information.'" Advisory Committee's Notes on
Fed. Rule of Evid. 602 (citation omitted) is premised on an assumption
that the expert's opinion will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and
experience of his discipline.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796 (1993).
54. Locascio, 6 F.3d at 938-39. The Second Circuit addressed the
argument that Agent Schiliro's testimony violated Rule 703 because he relied
on nameless informers. Id. at 938. However, the court held that Schiliro's
testimony is admissible since law enforcement personnel "reasonably rely upon
such hearsay in the course of their duties." Id.
55. Id. The court stated that reliance "upon inadmissible evidence
is ...less an issue of admissibility for the court then an issue of credibility for

the jury." Id.
56. See id. In Locascio, the Second Circuit stated that Daubert gave
significant deference to the authority and discretion of district courts in
admitting scientific evidence. Id. In this context, the court stated in dictum, "a
district court is not bound to accept expert testimony based on questionable
data simply because other experts use such data in the field." Id.
57. FED. R. EvID. 702. Rule 702 states: "If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise." Id.
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C. Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Federal Courts
The difference, of course, between federal and state law is that
now we have the Supreme Court of the United States telling us
that the rule of Frye v. United States5 8 does not apply in the
federal courts. 59 Instead, the federal courts have the Daubert
rule. 60
The Second Circuit operates under a precedent called United
States v. Williams 61 which might be characterized as the
reliability test. 62 In Williams, a certain number of factors were
set out, but the court stated that if the expert or scientific
evidence were helpful, and met a number of other criteria, the
58. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding an expert opinion based
on a scientific technique inadmissible unless the technique is "generally
accepted" as reliable in the relevant scientific community).
59. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2794
(1993). The Court stated that:
Given the Rules' permissive backdrop and their inclusion of a specific
rule on expert testimony that does not mention 'general acceptance,' the
assertion that the Rules somehow assimilated Frye is unconvincing. Frye
made 'general acceptance' the exclusive test for admitting expert
scientific testimony. That austere standard, absent from and
incompatible with the Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be applied
in federal trials.
Id.

60. Id. at 2794. For New York's response to Dauberi, see People v.
Wesley, 83 N.Y.2d 417, 423 n.2, 633 N.E.2d 451, 454 n.2, 611 N.Y.S.2d
97, 100 n.2 (1994). In Wesley, the New York Court of Appeals noted that
Daubert made clear that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 superseded the Frye
rule "at least in Federal Courts." Id. Without saying much more about
Daubert, the court stated that it would persist in following the Frye rule that
the particular procedure must be "generally acceptable" by the scientific
community as a whole. Id.
61. 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that spectrographic voice
analysis is not so inherently unreliable or misleading to warrant exclusion from
jury's consideration in every case), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979). But
see 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 595 n. 199 (1992) (finding that in subsequent cases the
Second Circuit has failed to follow the decision in Williams).
62. Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198. In Williams the Second Circuit referred to
this test as the "reliability test." Id. The Second Circuit stated that the sole
issue was whether the scientific evidence "has reached a level of reliability
sufficient to warrant its use in the courtroom." Id.
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evidence would tend to be admissible as well. 63 One of the
factors, although not the only factor, stated by the Second Circuit
was whether or not experts in the pertinent field generally
accepted the scientific data. 64
Frye has been adopted by most state courts 65 and federal
circuits 66 with the exception of the Second Circuit. 67

63. Id. The Second Circuit examined different criteria when determining
whether the spectrographic analysis would be admissible. Id. The court stated
that "[s]election of the 'relevant scientific community' appears to influence the
result."
Id. Furthermore,
"a technique
unable to garner any
support... within the scientific community would be found unreliable by a
court." Id.
64. Id. The other factors that the court examined to determine the
reliability of the scientific evidence included "the potential rate of error," "the
existence and maintenance of standards," "care and concern with which a
scientific technique has been employed," and an "analogous relationship with
other types of scientific techniques. ... " Id. at 1198-99.
65. See, e.g., Scales v. City Court of Mesa, 594 P.2d 97, 100 (Ariz.
1979) (adopting Frye standard); Ward v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles,
1994 WL 517002 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 15, 1994) (adopting Frye test to the
horizontal gaze nystagmus test to determine alcohol content in blood); Reed v.
State, 391 A.2d 364, 372 (Md. 1978) (adopting Frye test for scientific
evidence); State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 425 (Minn. 1989) (stating that
DNA evidence is generally admissible under the Frye test).
66. See, e.g., Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1116
(5th Cir. 1991) (adopting the Frye test for a finding of what is scientifically
correct), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992); United States v. Smith, 869
F.2d 348, 353 (7th Cir. 1989) (settling the manner in which the Frye test is to
be applied); Novack v. United States, 865 F.2d 718, 721 (6th Cir. 1989)
(stating that an expert's opinion be based on a "theory that is generally
accepted in the relevant scientific community"); United States v. Gillespie, 852
F.2d 475, 481-82 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that evidence concerning
anatomically correct dolls needed to qualify under Frye); United States v.
Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 61 (D.C. Cir.) (adopting Frye standard to determine
admissibility of expert testimony "regarding the characteristics of pathological
gamblers"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817 (1987).
67. Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198. The standard in Williams rejects the rule
enunciated in Frye in favor of a more liberal approach to the admission of
scientific evidence. Id. The Second Circuit looked only to the admissibility or
non-admissibility of a particular type of scientific evidence and did not
necessitate a survey and categorization of the subjective views of a number of
scientists. Id.
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federal circuits that had adopted Frye had a

68
somewhat different way in which it defined and applied Frye.

Frye very simply stated that when courts examine novel scientific
evidence, the court must ask the question as to whether the

method of the underlying theory and even the application of the
novel scientific technique is generally accepted as reliable by
69
experts in the pertinent field.
Of course there were always debates about what is the pertinent
field, and obviously a technique can embrace many different
pertinent fields. 7 0 Then there was the mystery of what is meant
In United States v. Jackobetz, the Second Circuit reaffirmed the ruling in
Williams and explained that the Second Circuit has abandoned Frye and rather
looked to the Federal Rules of Evidence in determining the admissibility of
scientific evidence. 955 F.2d 786, 794 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104
(1992). The court, in Jackobetz, stated that the Williams test is nothing more
than "a balancing of the reliability of the evidence against its potential negative
impact on the jury." Id.
The Third Circuit as well has not adopted the Frye test. See United States v.
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985) ("The language of Fed. R.
Evid. 702... and the experience with the F.ye test suggest the
appropriateness of a more flexible approach to the admissibility of novel
scientific evidence.").
68. See, e.g., Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1110 (examining both the Frye
and Federal Rules of Evidence to determine whether to admit expert
testimony); Shorter, 809 F.2d at 60 (examining expert testimony under the
"three part test mandated by Frye"); United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp.
893, 895 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (upholding exclusion of psycho linguistic testimony
due to lack of general acceptance among physcial and scientific authorities).
69. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
70. See Katharyne C. Johnson, Exiting the Twilight Zone: Changes in the
Standardfor the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence in Georgia, 10 GA. ST. U.
L. REv. 401, 427-28 (1994). Johnson states that with complex scientific
evidence where the specialized field is narrow, "the trial court should note
whether the qualifications and skills an expert possesses provide the requisite
knowledge necessary to address the issues before the court." Id. at 427. When
the evidentiary challenge "is based on the manner in which a procedure was
performed, a technician may be well qualified to testify about the questioned
technique." Id. However, if the evidentiary challenge is based on the
"reliability of the scientific theory which underlies it, the same technician who
may be qualified to testify as to the operation of a machine may be unqualified
to give meaningful testimony about the scientific principles upon which the test
is based." Id at 427-28. Additionally, "even an eminently qualified expert may
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by general acceptance; how does one determine it and what is the

burden of proof. 7 1 Do you have to prove it by a preponderance
of the evidence? Do you have to prove it by a reasonable doubt?

In order for something to be generally accepted, must the
scientific method be published in a peer review scientific journal?
I do not know if any of you know what a peer review scientific
journal is, but I will explain it quickly. As opposed to law
journals, where we have students edit the journals and decide
which articles are incorporated, peer review scientific journals

have this notion that other scientists will review the work of a

72
scientist and vet it to see whether or not it should be published.
That at least is the theory. A peer review scientific journal is a
journal where one cannot get an article published unless
somebody has presumptively reviewed it, asked for changes,
even reviewed one's underlying data, although that is

comparatively

rare,

and

then

finally

approved

it

for

be unable to provide meaningful assistance in understanding a novel theory
from within his general discipline that does not impact his particular area of
expertise." Id. at 428.
71. See United States v. Williams, 443 F. Supp. 269, 273 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (stating that general acceptance requires agreement by a "substantial
section of the scientific community"), aff'd, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1117 (1979); United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685
(D. D.C.), rev'd on other grounds, 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In
Zeiger, the district court attempted to define the phrase "general acceptance."
Id. at 687. The court noted that "[t]he cases following the Frye rationale have
been carefully considered and they offer little guidance." Id. The court defined
the term "general" to mean "'common to many, or the greatest number;
widespread; prevalent; extensive though not universal.'" Id. at 688. (citation
omitted). The court then determined that the polygraph test at issue had gained
"'general acceptance' although the precise limitations of the device and the
intricacies which affect its performance may not be understood to the complete
satisfaction of the scientific community." Id.
72. See Lawrence K. Altman, M.D., The Doctor's World; Peer Review is
Challenged, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1986, at C3. Peer review scientific journals
"involve the use of a professional person's peers to evaluate his or her work.
In publishing, the editors of journals send manuscripts they have received to
experts for their criticisms and opinions." Id. The editors review the expert
evaluations and decide which articles to publish. Id. "Often, the identity of the
reviewer, or referee, is kept secret from the author and sometimes also even
the referee's comments." Id.
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publication. 73 Then other scientists can look at the scientific
journal and decide whether or not they can replicate the results,
and by that fashion something becomes scientific knowledge and
eventually generally accepted scientific knowledge.
The Daubert decision really begins as a statutory construction
of Rule 70274 which provides: "If scientific, technical or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. " 75
The Court began its examination of Rule 702 by explaining that
scientific knowledge is mentioned in Daubert.7 6 If we think
knowledge implies not just anything that a person who can be
qualified as a scientist says, but some systematic body of thought,
then there has to be some threshold standard of reliability. 77

73. Id. "When the peer review system works well, it prevents errors,
improves the quality of accepted papers and helps editors select the most
worthy submissions. In theory, the system prevents false claims and
duplication among scientific journals." Id. Dr. Stephen Lock, editor of the
British medical journal and a staunch defender of peer review, states that many
journals are restricted by tight budgets and are subsidized by professional
societies with political interests. Id. This creates a potential conflict of interest
between journal editors and professional societies who provide the income on
which the journal depends. Id.
74. Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2794. The Supreme Court. upon examination of
Rule 702, held that Rule 702 "makes no mention of Fr'e, and a rigid 'general
acceptance' requirement would be at odds with the 'liberal thrust' of the
Federal Rules and their 'general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to
'opinion' testimony.'" Id. (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S.
153, 169 (1988)).
75. FED. R. EvID. 702.

76. Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2795. Justice Blackmun examined Rule 702 and
stated simply that in order for this rule to govern "'Itlhe subject of an expert's
testimony nmust be 'scientific ... knowledge."" Id. (citation omitted)
(emphasis added).
77. Id. In Daubert, the Supreme Court defined the adjective "scientific" to
mean "a grounding in the methods and procedures of science" and the noun
"knowledge" as "more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation." Id.
The Court determined that "in order to qualify as scientific knowledge an
inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific method." Id. Thus. the
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Certainly, science implies that there is some rigor to some
threshold to what can be introduced in court other than just that it
would be relevant or it would tend to help resolve a fact in issue.
Thus, the Court reviewed the term "scientific knowledge" and
explained that Rule 702 requires some reliability, 78 and also
79
requires that it assists the trier of fact and is helpful.
Justice Blackmun's decision in Daubert then begins by
explaining that there is a reliability prong and a relevance
prong. 80 Justice Blackmun also said something very important

which makes this quite an interesting decision. He explained that
there also has to be what Judge Becker in United States v.
Downing81 called an issue of fit, whereby the scientific method at

issue must be valid for the purpose for which it is offered. 82

What one finds all the time is that there may be certain scientific

techniques that are valid for one purpose, but when you try to
apply them forensically, that is, within the court or forum, for
the purpose of resolving a legal dispute, it may not be valid and

one may need additional kinds of scientific testing and
experimentation to validate

it for that purpose. 83 Justice

Court concluded that requiring an expert's testimony to qualify as scientific
knowledge "establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability." Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. Justice Blackmun explained that a further requirement of Rule 702
is that it "'assist the trier offact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue."' Id. (emphasis added) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702). Justice
Blackmun stated that when expert testimony is not ultimately relevant it will
also be "non-helpful" to the trier of fact. Id. at 2795.
80. Id. ("[U]nder the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.").
81. 753 F.2d 1224, 1226 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that district court erred
in refusing to admit testimony of an "expert in the field of human perception
and memory ... concerning the reliability of eyewitness identifications at a
criminal prosecution.").
82. Id. at 1242. "An additional consideration under Rule 702 -- and
another aspect of relevancy -- is whether expert testimony proffered in the case
is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a
factual dispute." Id.
83. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796 (stating that if something is
scientifically valid for one purpose it does not necessarily mean that it is
scientifically valid for another purpose); see also James E. Starrs, Frye v.
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Blackmun stated that for purposes of determining whether
evidence is helpful one must decide whether or not there is fit or
whether there is a "valid scientific connection."84 It must be
valid for the purpose for which it is offered.
Premised on this theory, the Court then addressed a number of
factors that trial courts may consider in determining whether the
evidence is both reliable and relevant, 85 and whether there is a
valid scientific connection or fit. One of the Court's
considerations was whether the technique is capable of being
tested and if, in fact, it has been tested. 86 What the court is
referring to when it speaks of whether the scientific techniques
has been tested is what Karl Popper 87 and other scientific
philosophers refer to as controlled experimentation or classic
U.S. Restructured and Revitalized: A Proposal to Amend Federal Evidence
Rule 702, 26 JuRmErRIcs J. 249, 258-59 (1986). This article was cited in
Daubert for the proposition that scientific validity for one purpose may not be
"fit" for another purpose. Starrs provides the following illustrations where this
rule may be applied:
(a) When the issue is whether the laser is a scientifically valid technique
to visualize fingerprints, surgeons who have witnessed a marked
improvement in their surgical skills under the impetus of laser-assisted
surgery would not be competent witnesses to the scientific validity of the
laser fingerprint identification usage.
(b) Even though HLA blood may be acceptable in paternity cases where
laboratory conditions of cleanliness in the testing of fluid blood prevail,
that fact should not guarantee the acceptability of HLA typing of dried,
mixed, and contaminated blood derived from field situations in criminal
cases....

Id.
84. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796 ("Rule 702's 'helpfulness' standard
requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition
to admissibility.").
85. 1d. The Court noted that the following factors would not be an
exhaustive list. Id. These factors include: whether the technique has been
tested; whether the technique has been subjected to peer review or publication;
the potential rate of error; and whether the technique is generally accepted. Id.
at 2797.
86. Id. at 2796.
87. See

KARL

R.

POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DiscovERY (1959).

Popper is viewed by many as the most contemporary philosopher of science.
His major thesis is that a hypothesis is scientific only if it can specify the
results that would show it to be false.
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empiricism. 88 The focus of discussion is whether or not the
method at issue has been tested and what is its potential error
rate. 89 Another factor the Court considered was whether or not
the method is generally accepted in the relevant scientific field

and what standards apply. 90 A final factor which again is not
determinative, is whether the method had been peer-reviewed in a
scientific publication. 9 1
What is this going to change? I would submit to you, quite a
lot. There is a recent publication, called Shepard's "Expert and

Scientific Evidence Quarterly." Professor Jonakait, who you
heard this morning, 92 has an article in this publication. I have
one of my briefs in there as well, relating to truth in advertising.
There are a group of people who write about experts in this

journal. But what is fascinating about it, in the wake of Daubert,
is that there is expert testimony that was admitted under Frye

because it had always been admitted, particularly in the area of
forensic science, which will now probably have very little
support scientifically if you are to look at it in the rigorous way
that Justice Blackmun suggests we do in Daubert.9 3
88. BALLENTINE'S LAw DICTIONARY 399 (3d ed. 1969) (defining
empiricism to mean "searching for knowledge by experiment"). See Helen W.
Winston, "An Anomaly Unknown ": Supreme Court Application of International
Law Norms on Indigenous Rights in the Cherokee Cases (1831-32), 1 TULSA J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 339 (1993) ("It was Galileo who first developed the idea,
axiomatic for us today, that observation and experiment are the principal
criteria for scientific truth; that science is grounded in empiricism, not
authority.").
89. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796-97.
90. Id. at 2797 ("The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is ...a flexible
one. Its overarching subject is the scientific validity - and thus the evidentiary
relevance and reliability - of the principles that underlie a proposed
submission. The focus ...must be solely on principles and methodology, not
on the conclusions that they generate.").
91. Id.; see supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
92. Randolph N. Jonakait, Coconspirator Statements and Former
Testimony in New York and Federal Courts with Some Comments on
Codification, 11 TOURO L. REV. 37 (discussing the admissibility of coconspirator statements under New York and federal law).
93. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796. Justice Blackmun has been praised for
making judges think more like scientists by focusing on scientific factors that
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Examples are things like handwriting analysis. 94 There has
been much written in the legal literature about the fact that there
is almost no scientific experimentation that supports the position
that a documents expert can look at a series of signatures and
give a scientific basis for his conclusions which would be better
95
than any lay person's conclusions.
Where is the underlying scientific basis? Can this be tested? Is
there scientific data that is capable of being tested or has been
tested? Do we know what the error rate is for a document
examiner? Are there standards by which we can look at it? Has
the work been generally accepted by peer review journals
explaining what their techniques are so one can try to replicate
their methods? These are the questions that will be asked about

unquestionably in handwriting analysis, 96 fiber evidence, 97 and
are usually considered when deciding whether a proposition is empirically
valid. Furthermore, Daubert demanded judges to do more than determine
scientific validity but rather to see if the science offered "fits" the question at
issue. Id. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After Daubert:
Developing a Similarly EpistemologicalApproach to Ensuring the Reliability,of
Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 15 CARDoZO L. REV. 2271, 2277 (1994)
(stating that the factors Justice Blackmun directed trial judges to consider are
"the very questions which an empirical scientist normally addresses in deciding
whether a proposition has been experimentally verified").
94. See, e.g., United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1336-37
(upholding testimony of handwriting expert under Rule 702, noting that despite
testimony's lack of certainty it may be helpful in assisting the trier of fact),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1044 (1982).
95. See D. Michael Risinger, Mark P. Denbeaux & Michael J. Saks.
Exorcism of Ignorance as a Pro.r, for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of
Handwriting Identification "Expertise", 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731, 750-51
(1989). The article states that:
If a jury can compare handwriting no worse than proffered 'experts,'
then the expertise does not exist. For any given task, the level of
performance of professional document examiners may be no better than
that of laypersons. Indeed, lay persons might perform some tasks
consistently

better

then

'experts.'

. .

.

[Nbo

available

evidence

demonstrates the existence of handwriting identification expertise.
Id.
96. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text; see also Mark A.
Rothstein, Wrongfid Refusal to Hire: Attaching the Other Half of the
Enployment-At-Will Rule, 24 CONN. L. REv. 97, 146 n. 162 (1991). The
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hair analysis, 98 as well as a number of other forensic
techniques 9 9 such as ballistics. 100
One of the things that I should also probably point out is that
Daubert arguably is going to be a very interesting decision
because on its face commentators might think that more scientific
evidence will be admissible because Daubert is a "flexible test,"
and not as rigid as Frye. Frye is rigid. Frye presumably held that

scientific validity of handwriting analysis has not been established and many
so-called handwriting experts have no formal training and learn handwriting
analysis through a correspondence course. Id.
97. Fiber analysis received publicity in the Wayne Williams trial. Williams
v. State, 312 S.E.2d 40, 71 (1983) (holding that the trial court did not err in
admitting fiber evidence to aid in establishing the identity of the defendant as
the perpetrator of the murders in question). See Irving C. Stone, Capabilities
of Modern ForensicLaboratories, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 659 (1984). In
the Wayne Williams case, analysts matched "carpet fibers taken from the
bodies of several victims with fibers from the rugs and carpets in the home and
automobile of the defendant." Id. at 662. Forensic scientists must remain
abreast of "polymer fiber types" because new fibers are developed each year.
Id.
98. See Stone, supra note 97, at 662. The analysis of hair samples is
conducted by applying the technique of comparative microscopy. Id. The
forensic scientist compares the surface and "internal morphological features of
known and questioned hairs under the forensic comparison microscope." Id.
Usually, the forensic scientist can determine that a particular person is not the
source of a hair. Id. However, if all microscopic features are similar, then the
examiner can only reach the conclusion that the questioned hairs might have
originated from the same source. Id.
99. See Henry C. Lee, Forensic Science and the Law, 25 CONN. L. REV.
1117 (1993). "[F]orensic science draws upon the principles and methods of all
the traditional sciences, such as physics, chemistry, biology and mathematics."
Id. Forensic science includes the following areas: fingerprints comparison,
document examination, firearms and toolmarks comparison, drug
identification, imprints and pattern evidence comparison, comparison of blood
and body fluids, and identification of hair, fiber, glass, soil and other types of
trace and transfer evidence. Id. at 1118.
100. Ballistics is "Itihe science of gun examination frequently used in
criminal cases, especially cases of homicide, to determine the firing capacity
of a weapon, its fireability, and whether a given bullet was fired from a
particular gun." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 143 (6th ed. 1990).
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the judge is not supposed to look at the science. 101 During a Fye
analysis, all the judge need do is count noses, as United States v.
Williams explained. 1 02 In other words, the number of scientists
in the field will be counted and if they all agree the evidence will
be admissible. However, judges are not scientists and they do not
want to listen to a battle of experts and have to judge what is
good and what is bad science. Daubert does not give federal
judges that luxury anymore. Judges now have to come to grips
with the science. 103
Efforts are actually being made to improve a judge's
understanding of scientific principles. The Federal Judicial

Center is convening various educational programs to try to make
scientists, lawyers, and judges scientifically literate. 104 Believe
me, I have tried to get literate, and it is not an easy task.
D. Daubert and DNA Evidence

The Daubert decision, if analyzed, may even change DNA
evidence,

105

which is complicated enough. I just wrote an article

101. Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (stating that evidential force of the scientific
principle must be recognized and sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs).
102. Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198 (stating that "[a] determination of
reliability cannot rest solely on a process of 'counting [scientific] noses.'").
103. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. 2786. Pursuant to Rule 702 the trial judge is
assigned the "task of ensuring that an expert's testimony rests on a reliable
foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. Pertinent evidence based on
scientifically valid principles will satisfy those demands." Id. at 2799.
104. See, e.g., Victoria Slind-Flor, Helping Judges To Judge Science, NAT.
L.J. A5 (March 14, 1994). This article makes reference to a manual which
will be distributed in the latter part of 1994, by the Federal Judicial Center, to
help guide judges with cases involving complicated scientific testimony. Id.
"The manual will cover the admissibility of expert testimony and will discuss
cases in which the court ought to appoint an expert for itself under Rule 706 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence ... and will include

[topics such] as

epidemiology, toxicology, statistical inference and forensic analysis of DNA."
Id.
105. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 480 (6th ed. 1990). DNA identification is
"a method of determining distinctive patterns in genetic material in order to
identify the source of a biological specimen, such as blood, tissue or hair." Id.
See infra notes 106-127 and accompanying text.
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that talks about this very issue. 106 There is an interesting
application of the Daubert analysis in Judge Pratt's written
decision in United States v. Jakobetz, 10 7 which was decided
before Daubert and also before a lot of the developments in the
area of DNA testing.
There is a simple application of how that sort of DNA analysis
might work, and it can be compared to the recent New York
Court of Appeals case, People v. Wesley. 108 I will use the

hypothetical where one is conducting a DNA analysis to show
that the blood evidence left at a crime scene matches the
defendant's blood.

The way DNA tests generally work is that you try to match the
various sections of the DNA and then give some kind of statistic
about the probability that this defendant is the source of the
DNA. 109 I am not talking about instances where DNA analysis
excludes someone as being the source of the DNA. That has
never been an issue scientific or legally. 110 An exclusion under
106. Barry C. Scheck, DNA and Daubert, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1959
(1994) (stating that Daubert requires the courts to take a "much more
sophisticated and informed analysis of scientific evidence than Frye v. United
States").
107. 955 F.2d 786, 800 (2d Cir. 992) (concluding that DNA profiling
should rarely be excluded from jury consideration, and thus, that the district
court "properly exercised its discretion in admitting the DNA profiling
evidence proffered by the government in this case...").
108. 83 N.Y.2d 417, 422, 633 N.E.2d 451, 454, 611 N.Y.S.2d 97, 100
(1994) (holding that the standard to be used in determining whether novel
DNA profiling evidence is properly admissible is whether the reliability of
DNA evidence is generally accepted by the relevant scientific community at
the time of the proceedings).
109. See Richard Sloane, DNA Evidence and its Underlying Research, 212
N.Y. L.J. 5 (Aug. 23, 1994). DNA analysis is a six-step procedure: "(1)
extraction of DNA ... ; (2) fragmentation by restriction enzymes . . .; (3) gel
electrophoresis ... ; (4) southern blotting ... ; (5) hybridization... ; [and] (6)
autoradiograph. . . ." Id. In addition to the steps above there are two

additional steps: (1) "the determination that any two samples of DNA are
identical; and [(2)] that the 'match' of the two samples is the clinching proof,
but only if its significance is accepted as reliable by the scientific community."
Id.
110. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 205, at 369 (John William Strong
ed., 4th ed. 1992) ("From the outset, it was recognized that if the suspect's
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DNA analysis is just like a blood type; either it is blood type A
or it is blood type B. You do not have to calculate statistics.

Thus, there are no particular problems in this technology when
there is a non-match. It has really never been an issue in
controversy. However, matches, or so-called matches, have been
an issue. 111
Now let us consider a Daubert analysis. The kind of DNA
techniques that are employed in courts are techniques that are
used for purposes initially of doing DNA disease diagnosis.112
For example, one would look at the DNA of the mother and the
DNA of the father, and compare it to the DNA of the child to
determine whether then the child has a diseased gene. 113 Nobody
doubts that we can do that for purposes of a diagnosis of disease,
where you are only looking at the DNA of the mother, the father,
and the child. Where it gets more complicated is when you are in
a forensic case and have samples that are subjected to

antigens do not match those in the sample found at the scene of a crime, then
the incriminating trace does not consist of his blood.").
111. Id. The authors note that:
For a considerable time

. . .

there was a difference of judicial opinion

concerning evidence of a match. Since some combinations of antigens
are relatively common, a few courts dismissed the positive test results
for these anitgens as irrelevant. The better view - and the overwhelming
majority position - is that positive findings are neither irrelevant noi so
innately prejudicial as to justify a rule against their admission.
Id.
112. See Laurel Beeler & William R. Wiebe, DNA Identification Tests and
the Courts, 63 WASH. L. REV. 903, 907 (1988) (noting that DNA tests
developed for purpose of disease diagnosis).
113. See Virginia P. Sybert, Principles of Genetics in the MolecularEra; A
Primerfor Dermatologists, 129 ARCHIVES OF DERMATOLOGY 1409-16 (1993).
Every individual has "two copies of every gene and each of the pair of genes is
linked to the DNA on its own chromosome." Id. For example. "!ilf an
affected individual is heterozygous for a polymorphism ...

we do not know

whether the mutant disease gene is located on the chromosome with
polymorphism I or the chromosome with polymorphism 2." Id. Only by
studying other family members can it be determined that family members
"with the disease always inherit polymorphism 1 and unaffected family
members always inherit polymorphism 2. we then know that in this family. the
mutant gene is on the same chromosome as polymorphism." Md.
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environmental insults, 114 and even more complicated is how to

determine where this evidence came from and what the statistics
are or what the frequency is of these DNA profiles in a given

population. But if you ask under the Daubertanalysis what is the
purpose of this methodology, the answer is that it is certainly
valid for certain purposes, but what is the purpose? I would

submit to you the purpose of DNA evidence in a so-called match
situation is to prove that this defendant is the source of the
DNA.115

For example, in a typical rape case, sperm is recovered on a
vaginal swab. Analyzing the DNA from the sperm one would
want to say that this defendant is the source of the DNA.

Analytically, then, if there is a so-called match there are then two
additional questions and probabilities which have more
significance under Daubert than they would have under Jakobetz
or related cases.
The first question concerns the frequency of the DNA matching

profile in some populations. However, I will not cover this area
of concern. Judge Pratt can tell you that this is scientifically an
extraordinarily controversial and complicated issue. 116 When
114. The competing views on the effect of environmental insults were
expressed in United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 167 (N.D. Ohio 1991), aff'd,
12 F.3d 540 (1993). Defense expert Dr. D'Eustachio concluded that the FBI's
study of the effects of chemical contaminants (including bacteria and yeast
contamination) had produced unexpected results in the DNA testing. Id. at
178. The government's expert, however, concluded that such environmental
insults have no effect on the outcome of the analysis in that the test will result
inconclusive or the DNA will be destroyed in its entirety. Id. at 176.
115. See, e.g., Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307 (4th Cir.) ("The
individuality of the DNA provides a dramatic new tool for the law enforcement
effort to match suspects and criminal conduct."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 472
(1992).
116. See Harlan A. Levy, DNA: Race, Ethnicity and Statistical Evidence,
206 N.Y. L.J. I (July 15, 1991). "The statistical frequency assigned will vary
depending on both the particular profile and the suspect's racial group, since
different genetic profiles occur with differing frequencies among Caucasians,
African-Americans and Hispanics." Id. DNA laboratories have studied the
frequencies of these genetic profiles and "estimate the frequency of the
suspect's profile" based on those studies. Id. "For example, the laboratory
might estimate in a given case that the suspect's DNA profile occurs in
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bands are discovered and found to match the profile, the question

that would then arise is what is the frequency of this match in the
North American Caucasian population? You may get an answer
such as one out of a million people. Some scientists will say it

cannot be that low a frequency or that rare a frequency. 117
Yet when one looks at the National Research Council of the
National Academy of Science's [hereinafter NRC] recent study 118
reported after Jakobetz, the second question raised after Daubert
concerns the error rate of a laboratory, since Daubert refers to
potential error rate. 119 This is something we have to know about
laboratories. In DNA evidence, it becomes more important than
ever because of the very few proficiency tests that have been
approximately every 200 million people in the Caucasian population, every 320
million people in the African-American population, and every 400 million
people in the Hispanic population." Id. Critics argue that "there are racial and
ethnic subgroups... within the Caucasian, African-American and Hispanic
populations that render useless population statistics based on such broad
population groupings." Id. Further, critics argue that "the population studies
must be done with broad population groups broken down into racial, ethnic and
geographic subgroups." Id.
117. These frequencies have been suspect due to the possibility of
"substructuring." See Yee, 134 F.R.D. at 174-75 (explaining the possible
effects of substructuring on matching). The defense counsel contended in Yee
that:

[Tihe basic design of the FBI Caucasion database was flawed because it
failed to take into account the likelihood that there is no such thing as an
American Caucasion population. Instead, in the view of the defense
experts, there was a significant likelihood of "substructure", whereby
the frequency of particular alleles might vary on the basis of the ethnic
ancestry of particular subpopulations within the overall American
Caucasion population.
Id.; William C. Thompson, Evaluating the Admissibility of New Genetic
Identification Tests: Lesions From the DNA War, 84 J. CRIM. L. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 22, 91 (1993) (addressing several flaws with such frequency
evaluations).
118. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENsIC
SCIENCE 51-52 (Nat'l Acad. Press 1992) [hereinafter NRC REPORT]. This
study was initiated in January 1990, in response to the controversy that was
arising over the reliability, methodological standards, and interpretation of
population statistics that accompany DNA typings in the courtroom.
119. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797. Under Daubert, a laboratory must
determine a reasonably reliable estimate of its potential error rate. Id.
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done at DNA laboratories. I am only referring to open
proficiency tests, which is a situation where the DNA laboratory
is given samples to test in order to see if there is a match; as
opposed to blind proficiency testing in which external blinds are
conducted by an outside agency. 120 Blind proficiency tests are
considered to be the more rigorous and acceptable form of
proficiency testing. 121 Even in an open proficiency testing, some
of the best known laboratories have made false positive
matches. 122 One can find false positive matches in any laboratory
based on a sampling handling error or a misapplication of
protocol. 123
So the question then is what is the rate of false positive error
for a particular laboratory and what should be told to the jury? If
the NRC states, for example, that the rate of false positives is
one-in-a-hundred or one-in-a-thousand yet the coincidental or
gene frequency of this DNA match is really one-in-a-million,
telling the jury the one-in-a-million statistic and not the one-in-ahundred or the one-in-a-thousand statistic is then really
misleading. 124
120. See generally State v. Alt, 504 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. App. 1993).
"'Blind' proficiency tests [occur when] ... an analyst would be unaware of
the test." Id. at 48. "'[O]pen testing [occurs when] the analyst is given known
samples . . . .'" Id.
121. See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 110, § 205, at 372 (recommending
blind proficiency tests as prerequisite to the admissibility in courts of
laboratory DNA testing).
122. See, e.g., People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985
(Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1989). In Castro, defense counsel successfully
charged Lifecodes, a prominent DNA laboratory, with scientific fraud. Id. at
978 n.15, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 998 n.15. After several changes of opinion,
Lifecodes acknowledged that its firm's testing had not revealed a match. Id.
123. False-positive means "relating to or being an individual or a test result
that is erroneously classified in a positive category (as of diagnosis) because of
imperfect testing methods or procedures." WEBSTER'S MEDICAL DESK
DICTIONARY 235 (1986).
124. See Kenneth R. Krieling, DNA Technology in Forensic Science,
Committee on DNA Technology, 33 JURIMETRICS J. 449, 480 (1992). Krieling
noted that:
Human error in applying the complex multistep technology may be
overlooked. Subjective aspects of interpreting the images may not be
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This is not good science and it probably has Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 problems in terms of unfair prejudice. 125 It appears
that the laboratories' potential error rate may very well be that

high, particularly in DNA testing, when it is compared with the
extremely low frequencies that one would otherwise get. So, the
NRC -- and again, this is all after the Jakobetz decision recommended that juries be told first what the frequency of the
DNA profile is in a population, but second and most importantly
26
to be told what the error rate is of the laboratory. 1 It is
interesting to see that even though the NRC wrote this before
Daubert was decided, the Supreme Court in Daubert focused on
this very factor of laboratory's potential error rate as one of its
key factors. 127
E. Expert Testimony in New York: Frye Lives on

I could say a lot more about testing and general acceptance in
that regard, but it is probably not worth it at this point. I have

challenged. The question of error rates and false positive rates may not
be raised or, if raised, lost in the conflict of probabilities. The danger of
random match probability being erroneously converted by the trier into
a probability that the defendant is the source of the evidence continues
and may be exacerbated by the ...

principle guesstimates.

Id.

125. FED. R. EvID. 403. Rule 403 provides that "[allthough relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence." Id.
126. The NRC REPORT report stated:
Especially for a technology with high discriminatory power, such as
DNA typing, laboratory error rates must be continually estimated in
blind proficiency testing and must be disclosed to juries. For example,
suppose the chance of a match due to two persons' having the same
pattern were I in 1,000,000, but the laboratory had made one error in
500 tests. The jury should be told both results; both facts are relevant to
a jury's determination.
NRC REPORT, supra note 118, at 89.

127. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797 (listing laboratory's potential error
rate as a factor to consider).
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about a half a second to talk about Frye12 8in New York. New
York has a Frye standard.

129

One thing, though, that I would

note about the Frye standard and the way it is applied in New
York is the way the notion of "fit" articulated in Daubert floats
through the New York decisions in a very interesting way.

For example, when the New York Court of Appeals heard
cases on child sexual abuse, the court admitted typical syndrome
evidence. 130 The court heard testimony on a body of scientific
knowledge based upon studies of children who have been

sexually abused and empirical findings of certain characteristics
of these children. 13 1 In rape trauma cases, 132 the New York

Court of Appeals also admitted testimony that included syndrome
evidence, based on empirical studies conducted of women who
had been raped and the following characteristics that they would

128. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding
that "the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs").
129. See, e.g., People v. Wesley, 83 N.Y.2d 417, 633 N.E.2d 451, 611
N.Y.S.2d 97 (1994) (applying Frye test to determine whether DNA profiling
was admissible in this case); People v. Keene, 156 Misc. 2d 108, 110, 591
N.Y.S.2d 733, 735 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1992) ("The admissibility of
novel scientific evidence is governed in New York by the rule originally set
forth in Frye v. United States ....").
130. See In the Matter of Nicole V., 71 N.Y.2d 112, 121, 518 N.E.2d 914,
917, 524 N.Y.S.2d 19, 23 (1987) (admitting testimony on sexually abused
child syndrome).
131. Id. ("[Sexually abused child syndromel is a recognized diagnosis based
upon comparisons between the characteristics of individuals and relationships
in incestuous families, . . and the characteristics of the individuals and
relationships of the family in question . . ").
132. People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 552 N.E.2d 131, 552 N.Y.S.2d 883
(1990). In Taylor the court stated that although there is no "typical" rape
victim and that there is a broad range of symptoms that may arise, "the
relevant scientific community has generally accepted that rape is a highly
traumatic event that will in many women trigger the onset of certain
identifiable symptoms." Id. at 286, 552 N.E.2d at 134, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 886.
Thus, the court listed several symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder which
many rape victims experience. Id. at 286-87, 552 N.E.2d at 134, 552
N.Y.S.2d at 886-87.
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possess. 133 The same type of syndrome evidence can be seen
13 4
with battered women cases.

Then one must ask about the fit question. Having this data, can
we then allow an expert to come into court and say, "I have
examined the child, the child is not sleeping, the child has
intrusive nightmares, the child has defecated for no reason in the
middle of night, the child goes through some of these ten
categories that a social scientist named Sigoria identified and
therefore this child was sexually abused." I believe the answer is
no because it is not valid for the purpose for which it is offered.
What the New York Court of Appeals stated in child sexual
abuse cases is similar to what was stated in the Kelley Michaels
case in New Jersey. 135 The New York Court of Appeals states
that one can introduce expert syndrome testimony only for the

purposes of rebutting a myth that a jury might otherwise
believe. 136 An example of such a myth would be that a child who
was sexually abused would immediately report this abuse. If that
133. Id. at 286-87, 552 N.E.2d at 134-35, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 886 (explaining
that rape victims experience common symptoms of posttraumatic stress
disorder).
134. See, e.g., People v. Ciervo, 123 A.D.2d 393, 394, 506 N.Y.S.2d 462,
463 (2d Dep't 1986). In order to support the claim that Ciervo believed she
was in imminent, life-threatening danger, her defense expert was allowed to
introduce evidence that a prior pattern of beatings by the decedent created that
perception. Id.
135. State v. Michaels, 625 A.2d 489, 499 (N.J. App. Div. 1993)
(reversing defendant's conviction based on fact that state's expert went beyond
the limited permissible scope of syndrome testimony), aff'd, 642 A.2d 1372
(1994). The court stated that "child-abuse expert evidence is admissible only
for the purpose of rehabilitation-explaining traits often found in children who
had been abused." Id. Furthermore, the court explained that it is the role of the
expert to only refer to specific behavioral characteristics of the victim, which
might seem to be inconsistent is actually consistent with sexual abuse. Id.
136. In the Matter of Nicole V., 71 N.Y.2d 112, 518 N.E.2d 914, 524
N.Y.S.2d 19 (1987). "The psychological and behavioral characteristics and
reactions typically shared by victims of abuse in a familial setting are not
generally known by the average person. . . ." Id. Thus, it was admitted to
rebut any juror misconceptions. Id. at 120, 518 N.E.2d at 917, 524 N.Y.S.2d
at 23; People v. Keindl, 68 N.Y.2d 410, 422, 502 N.E.2d 577, 583, 509
N.Y.S.2d 790, 796 (1986) (rejecting the notion that syndrome evidence goes to
the issue of guilt).
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type of myth is somehow put into issue, then the witness can
testify to rebut that misconception the jurors might have.
However, such evidence cannot be used affirmatively to prove
that there was in fact sexual abuse or in a rape trauma syndrome
that there was in fact a rape. 137 I submit to you that even though
the New York Court of Appeals was working under a Frye
analysis to get to those results, they were really doing a fit
question.
F. FoundationalRequirements
The last point I will discuss, which can be very confusing to
people, is what I would call the notion of minimal foundational

requirements. 13 8 With regard to expert testimony and vetting it
by either what we will call a Daubertanalysis in federal courts or
a Frye analysis in New York, the question then arises as to the
defect. For example, if the evidence were challenged, would the
defect be a matter of weight or a matter of admissibility? This is
usually the determining factor.
One thing that New York has done very clearly in applying
Frye is that if a scientific method has been accepted by experts
generally, and if there is a particular protocol that should be
followed and is not followed, the evidence ought to be
precluded. 139 It is not a matter of weight, but rather a matter of
137. See Nicole V., 71 N.Y.2d at 120, 518 N.E.2d at 917, 524 N.Y.S.2d at
23 (admitting evidence to only inform juror's of typical characteristics of a
child who has been sexually abused).
138. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794-96. Rule 702 places limits on expert
testimony by assigning the trial judge the duty to ensure that an expert's
testimony rests on a reliable foundation and on relevance. Id. The Court states
to
testimony pertain
requires an expert's
Rule 702
that
"scientific ...

knowledge." Id. at 2795. "[S]cientific implies a grounding in

the methods and procedures of science." Id. "[K]nowledge... 'applies to any
body of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred from such facts or
accepted as truths on good grounds."' Id. (citation omitted). These factors
create a foundational requirement of reliability. Id.
139. See People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956, 979-80, 545 NY.S.2d 985,
999 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1989) (concluding "[a] pretrial hearing should be
conducted to determine if the testing laboratory substantially performed the

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss1/9

34

Scheck: Expert Testimony

1994]

EXPERT TESTIMONY

141

admissibility because, to use the terms of the New York Court of

1 4 1 the
Appeals in People v. Middleton1 4 0 and People v. Hughes,
generally accepted technique was not employed. So, if you do not

employ the generally accepted technique, or if you do not use the
right method, then the evidence should not come in. Again, it is

not a question of weight, or a question of "results," but rather a

question of admissibility.
In the Jakobetz decision, Judge Pratt said exactly the same

thing with respect to certain kinds of DNA challenges. 142 1 think
that these are kinds of minimal foundational requirements that
apply to any kind of evidence under Rule 104 of the Federal

Rules of Evidence, 143 or certainly even scientific evidence, and it
is often confused in the application by the courts.
Hon. George C. Pratt:

Thank you, Professor Scheck. Some of what Professor Scheck
said just brought to mind that much of the law of evidence is

based on certain assumptions that we make about people, about
scientifically accepted tests and techniques, yielding sufficiently reliable results
to be admissible as a question of fact for the jury").
140. 54 N.Y.2d 42, 45, 429 N.E.2d 100, 101, 444 N.Y.S.2d 581, 582
(1981) (holding that generally accepted technique of identification through
configurations of bite marks is admissible and that the weight of that evidence
was later to be determined by the jury).
141. 59 N.Y.2d 523, 542, 453 N.E.2d 484, 494, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255, 265
(1983) (hypnosis has not gained general acceptance as a reliable means of
restoring recollection), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 908 (1989).
142. 955 F.2d 786, 800 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992).
143. FED. R. EvID. 104. Rule 104 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Questions of admissibility generally.
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence
shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision
()....
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact
When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a
condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to. the
introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment
of the condition.
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how they think, how they perceive things, how they remember
things, what their experiences are and what normal reactions
might be under the circumstances.
That led my wondering mind to two things. My first thought
concerns Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence which is the

lay opinion rule1 44 and how that dovetails with the expert opinion
rule. 145 If you spend much time in state court you are bound to
hear an objection such as: "Objection Your Honor, that question
calls for the operation of the witness' mind." God forbid a
witness should think!

However, the theory for taking testimony is that a witness is
nothing but a recording machine or a tape-recorder in which they
just play it back in the courtroom without interpreting it in any

way. When witnesses testify their testimony does not go through
144. FED. R. EvID. 701. Rule 701 states that:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of
opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which
are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful
to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact
in issue.
Id. Under Rule 701, a witness may speak in terms of opinions if it makes the
testimony clearer and is based on actual perceptions by the witness. Id. See
MCCORMICK, supra note 110, § 11, at 18-19. "Under Rule 701 . . . the
witness must have personal knowledge of matter that forms the basis of
testimony of opinion . . . ." Id. at 19. "[The admission of the opinions of
non-expert witnesses may well be described, not as a rule excluding opinions,
but as a rule of preference." Id. at 18.
145. FED. R. EvID. 702. Rule 702 gives the courts great discretion in
determining whether an opinion from an expert in a specific field will assist the
finder of fact. See MCCORMICK, supra note 110, § 13, at 21. "Rule 702
should permit expert opinion even if the matter is within the competence of the
jurors if specialized knowledge will be helpful, as it may be in particular
situations." Id.; see also Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV.
414 (1952).
The necessity which makes opinion testimony of laymen admissible
arises out of the inadequacy of expression to communicate otherwise the
perceptions of the witness. The reason of necessity as applied to the
admission of expert testimony arises from the inability of triers of fact
to resolve certain issues requiring persons with special skills,
experience, or scientific knowledge to understand them.
Id. at 417.
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their minds, it just goes in and out, just like a court reporter who
simply hears things and takes down everything without thinking
about what is being said.
14 6 It
The lay opinion rule has done away with that objection.
does not work anymore because it permits any witness to testify
to opinions based upon his or her own observations. 14 7 It is a
14 8
very useful rule.

Then the question arises as to what makes an expert. A lay
witness can give an opinion but the test used to be an expert is it is really an expert opinion rule - an expert can testify to an
opinion because he knows more than other people about this, and
he can take information and process it and change its form a little
49
bit and tell you its clear implications. 1

My rule of thumb test for whether or not a witness is qualified
as an expert is simple. I hear the witness explain his experience,
and if there is an objection to the qualifications I would explain to
the jury that under the Federal Rules of Evidence an expert is any
person who knows more about what he is talking about than I do.
146. FED. R. EvID. 701, supra note 144. Rule 701 now allows a lay
witness to testify as to his or her opinions that are rationally based upon their
perception that will aid in making the testimony of that witness more clear or
the determination of a fact more clear. Id. Thus, an objection that a lay witness
is using his or her mind will usually not be sustained. Mattison v. Dallas
Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d 95, 110 (4th Cir. 1991). In Mattison, the trial court
allowed over objection the testimony of a lay witness' opinion "about the
adequacy of emergency flashers...." Id. The Fourth Circuit held that where
Rule 701 is satisfied, a lay witness can give his or her opinion and thus the
objection was properly overruled. Id.
147. FED. R. EvlD. 701(a). See supra note 144.
148. See, e.g., United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206, 1215 (2d Cir. 1992)
("Rule 701's authorization of lay opinion testimony was adopted because
'[w]itnesses often find difficulty in expressing themselves in language which is
not that of an opinion or conclusion.'" ) (citation omitted).
149. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (stating that a witness qualifies as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training or education); Scariati v. St. John's
Queens Hosp., 172 A.D.2d 817, 820, 569 N.Y.S.2d 189, 191 (2d Dep't 1991)
(stating that New York's common law approach provides for qualification
where the expert "'is skilled in the profession or field to which the subject
relates, and that such skill was acquired from study, experience or
observation'") (citation omitted).
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This witness obviously does, so he is qualified to testify. It does
not mean that you have to believe him.
The second thought concerns the idea that evidence is based
upon how people think and perceive things and process it in their
minds. However, we do not really know too much about how the
hidden mind works.
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